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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH# I 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 890615-CA 
v. i 
DENNIS LEROY WAITE, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for five counts of 
securities fraud, all felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
61-1-1 (1989) and five counts of theft by deception, four of 
which are second degree felonies and one of which is a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990), as the appeal is from a 
district court in a criminal case not involving a conviction of a 
first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the State followed the provisions of the 
Financial Information Privacy Act when it obtained defendant's 
bank records. The trial court's ruling that the exemption 
provision found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-50 (Supp. 1990) applied 
to this case is reviewed under a correction of error standard. 
State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1123 (Utah 1989). 
2. If the trial court erred in determining that the 
exemption to the Financial Information Privacy Act applied to 
this case, whether the error was harmless. To determine whether 
an error is sufficient to warrant reversal of a conviction, the 
appellate court must determine whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in the 
absence of the error. Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) and State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 561 (Utah 1987). 
3. Whether the trial court erred in admitting 
summaries of defendant's financial records which were prepared by 
an investigator from the Utah Securities Division. The standard 
for reviewing a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence is whether the ruling was clearly erroneous. State v. 
Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1118 (Utah 1989). 
4. Whether the trial court correctly sentenced 
defendant. A sentencing decision will not be disturbed unless it 
exceeds that prescribed by law or is an abuse of the court's 
discretion. State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 3, 1988, defendant was charged with five 
counts of securities fraud, all felonies, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 61-1-1 (1989), and five counts of theft by deception, 
four of which are second degree felonies and one of which is a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-405 
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(1990) (Record [hereafter R.] at 19-22). On March 31, 1989, 
defendant filed a memorandum in support of a motion to suppress 
defendant's bank records obtained by an investigator of the Utah 
Securities Division (R. at 80-99). The motion was heard on April 
6, 1989, and denied (R. at 100 and 265J.1 
The matter came on for trial by jury on August 3-4, 
1989, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, district judge, presiding (R. at 
2 
105-107 and 263-64). Defendant was found guilty of all ten 
charges (R. at 106 and 201-10). On September 18, 1989, defendant 
was sentenced to concurrent terms of one to fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison on five counts of securities fraud and four 
counts of theft by deception which were second degree felonies. 
He was also sentenced to a concurrent term of zero to five years 
on one count of theft by deception which was a third degree 
felony. Defendant was ordered to pay restitution to all of the 
victims (R. at 224-33). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 24, 1986, defendant, Dennis L. Waite, and 
Donald Stoddard and Arlo James became partners in a business 
known as Elite Investment Association, with defendant serving as 
general partner, and the other two as limited partners (R. 263 at 
105, R. 264 at 4 and Exhibit 14-S). The group was formed with 
The transcript of seven hearings, including, inter alia, the 
suppression hearing and sentencing proceedings, is contained in a 
separate volume which has been numbered as part of the record as 
page 265. 
2 
The two volumes of trial transcript are numbered as pages 263 
and 264 in the record. 
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the intent of pooling money for investment purposes (R. 263 at 
106). Defendant drew up the agreement forming the association 
and conducted the business of the organization (R. 263 at 105-
106). Defendant would "research[] all of the bonds" and then 
meet with Stoddard and James to advise them which bonds to invest 
in (R. 263 at 107-109 and R. 264 at 5). The group invested in 
bonds from St. George and Park City in November and December of 
1986, and bonds from Arizona, Montana, and Ogden in May and June 
of 1987 (Exhibit 23-S). None of the victims of the crimes 
charged in this case were investors in the bonds purchased by 
Elite Investment in late 1986 and early 1987 (Exhibit 23-S, R. at 
19-22, and R. 263 at 115-16). 
On March 12, 1987, defendant tendered his written 
resignation "as partner, trustee and bookkeeper in the Elite 
Investment Association" (Exhibit 20-S, R. 263 at 119-20, and R. 
264 at 6-7). On that day, defendant turned over the records of 
the association to Arlo James; these records consisted of a 
typewritten page listing the assets and disbursements of the 
association, and a sheet of paper listing the bonds purchased, 
the investors and amounts invested in the Park City, St. George, 
Ogden, and Montana bonds (R. 264 at 7-8 and Exhibits 21-S and 22-
S). From the information provided by defendant, James prepared a 
summary of investors and bonds involved in Elite Investment 
Association (Exhibit 23-S and R. 264 at 9-10). Before 
defendant's resignation, commitments to purchase three additional 
bonds had already been made; pursuant to these commitments, Elite 
Investment, now minus defendant, followed through with those 
-4-
purchases (R. 263 at 120-21). After those commitments were met 
in June 1987, Elite Investment never purchased any more bonds (R. 
264 at 13-17). 
On September 22, 1987, some six months after defendant 
resigned from Elite Investment, he met with Fawn and Ken Kendrick 
to help them reduce their income taxes (R. 263 at 16-17). 
Defendant told them that they needed a tax shelter and spoke to 
them about purchasing municipal bonds (R. 263 at 18). Defendant 
telephoned Mrs. Kendrick in November of 1987 and "said he had a 
very good bond with West Jordan [Sewer]" (R. 263 at 19). On 
December 8, 1987, the Kendricks gave defendant a check for 
$10,000.00 made out to Elite Investment Association (R. 263 at 19 
and Exhibit 1-S). Mrs. Kendrick's understanding at the time was 
that she and her husband were purchasing a municipal bond with 
West Jordan City (R. 263 at 19). One to two weeks later, the 
Kendricks received a "Certificate and Receipt", purportedly from 
the Elite Investment Association and signed by defendant as 
trustee of that association (R. 263 at 20 and Exhibit 2-S). The 
certificate stated that the Kendricks owned 100 percent of a 
$10,000.00 municipal bond from West Jordan Sewer and Water. The 
bond carried an interest rate of 8.67 percent with semiannual 
payments each year (Exhibit 2-S). 
The following month, January of 1988, defendant 
telephoned Mrs. Kendrick to tell her that he had an interest 
check for the Kendricks and asked if they wanted it mailed to 
them or reinvested. The Kendricks asked that it be mailed to 
them; after several phone calls to defendant, the Kendricks 
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received a check for $372.30, dated January 20, 1988 (R. 263 at 
22). 
In May of 1988, the Kendricks tried to contact 
defendant about an interest check that they should have received 
in April on a different bond for which they had given defendant 
money in October, 1987 (R. 263 at 21-23). Mrs. Kendrick finally 
spoke with defendant by phone in mid-July, 1988, at which time 
she informed him that she had spoken to the West Jordan City 
Attorney. The city attorney had told her that West Jordan had 
not issued any municipal bonds since 1984 (R. 263 at 24-25). 
Defendant told Mrs. Kendrick that her husband had consented to 
the purchase of Summit County-Park City bonds instead. Defendant 
told her that these bonds carried the same interest rate and that 
they were insured by FDIC (R. 263 at 25). Mrs. Kendrick asked 
that the bonds be put in the Kendricks' names and defendant 
responded that he was in the process of having that done (R. 263 
at 26). Defendant then sent the Kendricks a copy of a Park City 
Revenue bond which was registered to Elite Investment 
Association, was issued in 1986, and carried an interest rate of 
6.4 percent (R. 263 at 27 and 44-45 and Exhibit 3-S). Mrs. 
Kendrick became concerned about the discrepancies in the amount 
of the bond, the maturity date, and the interest rate. After 
contacting defendant about her concerns, she contacted the Utah 
Securities Division (R. 263 at 27-28). 
In December, 1987, Blaine Mecham also went to defendant 
for assistance with his income taxes; again, defendant mentioned 
the use of municipal bonds as a tax shelter (R. 263 at 50-51). 
-6-
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aware of the name was when he received the certificate (R. 263 at 
74 and 79-80). Mr. Neria never received any other document 
showing an ownership interest in the University of Denver bond; 
neither did he receive any interest payments (R. 263 at 70). 
Gordon and Shirley Jensen became acquainted with 
defendant when he sent them a letter stating that many former 
Kennecott employees (all of the victims are former Kennecott 
employees) "had erred in figuring their income tax and sending in 
their severance pay." Defendant's letter told them he would try 
to get money back for them if they would contact him. The 
Jensens eventually did contact defendant who, after reviewing 
their taxes, said that their returns had been filled out properly 
and he could not help them (R. 263 at 82-83). Defendant told the 
Jensens that they needed a tax shelter, and suggested a bond (R. 
263 at 83). The Jensens obtained cashier's checks totaling 
$2,000.00, which they gave to defendant on approximately January 
12, 1988 (R. 263 at 83-84 and Exhibits 9-S and 10-S). When they 
gave defendant the money, he told them that he could not make the 
bond without his secretary present and she was out of the office 
(R. 263 at 84). After several attempts to contact defendant, the 
Jensens eventually received a "Certificate and Receipt" from 
Elite Investment Association, signed by defendant as trustee, and 
stating that the Jensens owned 2 percent of a "$100,000.00 
University of Denver $2,000.00 Municipal Bond," with interest at 
the rate of 8.97 percent and semiannual payments (R. 263 at 84 
and Exhibit 11-S). 
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By stipulation, the State proffered the testimony of 
Marie Shanley, 
who works at the First Interstate Bank in 
Denver, Colorado. She is a trust officer for 
the bank. One of her duties is to issue all 
of the University of Denver bonds. She is 
familiar with the bonds issued at the 
University of Denver. She has reviewed all 
of her records for the years 1985 through 
1988 and would testify that there were no 
University of Denver bonds issued in the name 
of Dennis Waite or Elite Investment. 
(R. 264 at 38-39). 
Merlin J. Smith, of the Utah Securities Division, 
investigated the allegations against defendant beginning in July 
of 1988 (R. 264 at 19-20). On August 2 and 10, 1988, Mark 
Griffin, Assistant Utah Attorney General, Securities Division, 
signed applications seeking access to specified financial records 
involving this case (Brief of Appellant [hereafter Br. of App.], 
Addendum C(l); the appellate record in this matter was 
supplemented by stipulation with copies of the applications, 
affidavits in support thereof, and orders which had been filed in 
a separate district court file). Based on the orders signed in 
response to those applications, Mr. Smith reviewed bank records 
involving defendant (R. 264 at 20). Copies of those records were 
introduced at trial as Exhibits 17-S and 18-S (R. 264 at 1). A 
summary of the deposits and withdrawals from those records was 
compiled by Mr. Smith and introduced, over defendant's objection, 
as Exhibit 25 (R. 264 at 27-28). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The investigation of defendant's financial dealings 
conducted by the Utah Securities Division was not an 
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securities, the securities fraud counts punish defendant for acts 
different from the acts supporting the theft by deception 
charges. 
The trial court did err by sentencing defendant to 
prison terms of one to fifteen years on the securities fraud 
counts. The statute, at the time defendant was convicted and 
sentenced, mandated a prison term of zero to three years for 
securities fraud. This case should be remanded to the trial 
court to correct the sentences for the securities fraud counts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT 
WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH IN THE INVESTIGATION 
OF DEFENDANT'S BANK RECORDS. 
In the first two points of his brief, defendant 
contends that the State failed to comply with the provisions of 
the Financial Information Privacy Act in obtaining his bank 
records. Consequently, the records were inadmissible at trial. 
In 1988, the act provided: 
No person acting in behalf of the state, 
or any agency, office, department, bureau or 
political subdivision thereof, shall request 
or obtain, by subpoena or otherwise, 
information from a state or federally 
chartered financial institution regarding the 
financial transactions or other records 
reflecting the financial condition of any 
person without first obtaining written 
permission from the person whose financial 
transactions or other records of financial 
condition are to be examined, or obtaining an 
order from a court of competent jurisdiction 
permitting access to the information. . . . 
As used in this act "person" shall include an 
individual, corporation, partnership or 
association. 
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Utah Code Ann C 78-27-45 (1 4H I I amended II/H'M, n Lin.' pei: i-
seeking access to the records seeks a court order rathei thai" 
permifabi ui 1 J r*n] f hir [ <M MH whose records are to be examined, -
notice provision is written iriLo Lhe act, Al, \ hv I i in defend 
w a s chargedf this provision read: 
H I I 11 I tl te evei it a uuurt UJIIHI. Is 
obtained pursuant to §78-27-45, nu*. i-
thereof shall be given to the person about 
whom information is sought within three days 
of the day on which service of the order ? e 
made upon the financial institution, but nc 
later than seven days before the day fixed in 
the order as the day upon which the records 
are to be produced or examined. The notice 
shall be accompanied by a copy of the order 
which has been served upon the financial 
institution and the motion or application 
upon which it is based and shall be 
accompanied by a statement setting forth the 
rights of the person under §78-27-47. 
(2) The notice shall be sufficient
 A4 
or 'before the third day after issuance of t;.^  
order, notice is served in the manner 
provided in Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Civ 1 
Procedure, upon the person entitled to 
notice, or is mailed by certified or 
registered ma 1 ] to the last known address of 
the person. In the event the person entitled 
to notice is deceased or under legal 
disability, notice shall be served upon 
mailed to the last known address of such 
person's executor, administrator, guardia; :>r 
other fiduciary. 
"Irih f'ode Arm § 78-27-46 (1987 1, The provisions of §78-77-47 
ml i iili Mini MM- perHWII wl'iuirit"1 rerfirdh are to be examined has the* 
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[ttilowinq examination of his financial records) oi stay 
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state agency to comply •witli the procedures ui Lhe act restricts 
the admissibility of the Information obtained, Section ) -27-49 
p r o v i d e s , i™ T ^ r t m e m INIII •: 
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No information obtained directly or 
indirectly from a financial institution in 
violation of the provisions of this act shall 
be admissible in any court of this state 
against the person entitled to notice. 
The act is inapplicable to certain investigations. 
Before it was amended in 1989, the act provided: 
Nothing in this act shall apply where an 
examination of said records is a part of an 
official investigation by any local police, 
sheriff, city attorney, county attorney, the 
attorney general, or the State Department of 
Public Safety, or the Bureau of Recovery 
Services, Department of Social Services. 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-50 (1987) (amended 1989). 
Before trial, defendant filed a memorandum in support 
of a motion to suppress his financial records (R. at 80-99). The 
gravamen of his argument was that he had not been given notice of 
the application and order for access to the records, and that the 
affidavits upon which the applications were based were faulty 
because of a notary problem. Defendant did include a conclusory 
paragraph that the records were not obtained as part of an 
official investigation by the attorney general (R. at 83). When 
the motion came on for hearing on April 6, 1989, defendant 
focused on the failure to give notice (R. 265 at 2-9). In 
response, the State argued that the heading of the applications 
and orders bore the name of the attorney general, and the 
applications were signed by an assistant attorney general (R. 265 
at 9-10). The State also argued that the investigator from the 
Securities Division gave notice to defendant by delivering a 
letter to the Tooele County Jail, where defendant was being held, 
to defendant's wife, and to Arlo James, president of Elite 
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In order to sustain the trial court's ruling that this 
investigation was "an official investigation by . . . the 
attorney general," this Court would have to determine that the 
mere signing of pleadings by an assistant attorney general serves 
as an adoption of investigations which are being conducted by 
other state agencies. This stretches the meaning of S 78-27-50 
too far. The State concedes that the investigation of defendant, 
conducted by the Securities Division of the Utah Department of 
Business Regulation, was not an official investigation by the 
attorney general. The attorney general merely acted as counsel 
for the Securities Division; he did not independently or jointly 
initiate or conduct the investigation. Consequently, the notice 
provisions of § 78-27-46 should have been complied with by the 
investigating agency. Since the provisions were not followed, 
the bank records were inadmissible under § 78-27-49. 
POINT II 
EVEN THOUGH THE BANK RECORDS SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN ADMITTED AT TRIAL, THEIR ADMISSION WAS 
HARMLESS ERROR. 
Even though it was error to admit the bank records at 
trial, such error does not necessarily require reversal of 
defendant's convictions. Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, states: 
Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded. 
In State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989), the Supreme 
Court said: 
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In order to constitute reversible error, 
the error complained of must be sufficiently 
prejudicial that there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for Lht 
defendant in its absence. 
781 P 2d at 4J1, 
I ii I he p r e s e n t c a s e il IIImire i s m r e a s o n a b l e l i k e l i h o o d 
II i nil in L i i i i II 11 I i lt j ( p i id f i in I h i l l I I I I I hi 111* r e c o r d ^ 
been e x c l u d e d at t. i m i Thi- r e c o r d s deiiioiistio t ed t h a t defendant 
d e p o s i t e d the money r e c e i v e d from t h e tiv*-1 v i c t i m s 111 t h i s r a s e 
i n i t i i i i a . -
r ^F5 , i -ennis . * , - (Exhibi t . -
^ r r r j c , _ . • i t i o ' a 1 s* p u l a t i c n ^ 
funds from t h e a c c o u n t „\:« . &1 . c i i as - t - dhu a> •; i 
perftMihi I *- v t i o n s ( E x h i b x t o ±,-^t ^o z,, ~J~~ and 2 5 -
'. and K , 2 64 dt I - * i . 
If t h o s e f a c t s had no t been a d m i t t e d a t t r i a l , t h e 
il lit-1! i|M i denn - pi \\\.w\ I , i Inn t I <• I w< iu 1 I ,st I I I In IM»I« in i m s u f f i c i e n t 
III s u s t a i n d e f e n d a n t * b c o n v i c t i o n s Hie l i n i i s s x b i e evident:*." 
lm%'(h«i( t h a t d e f e n d a n t had t a k e n $ 2 / , 2 I M I Mil from f i v e p e o p l e , 
I i» 1 I II II u j l lii»jii I In i i I Ii i i II I mi I I I I i i I I I I Ii II mi II in | in in mi in I r j | in I 
b o n d s f o r t h e n i i I i Ih i i n I K | - S ( • - .T» # ' - ' ' Hi " I I [.. .iml 
! it 1 8 - 1 4 , S I - 1 ! J 6 5 - 6 8 , 8 3 - 8 4 , im 1 ' , l i t i - iant t i i I 
l l n j II ifc 1111 ir in l» i I I I ill In ini mi II II I in hahc i Wi i I  I M I I I H I Hpwer iiiill 
W a t e r Bond f o r flit-'iii (H ? M r\\ 1 9 - 2 1 ) \\\**\ l e c e i v e i l J 
r e r t i f i r a t p f* t h d t r t t e ^ t f r o m t h f E l i t e I nv i 'h tment A s s o c i a t i o n , 
II in 11| in II i II II iy d e 1 e n c l d J I I 111 II i u s l c i | I }\ 11 11 i I 111 
Tins c e r t i f i c a t e was neni in Decemfaei I 'JH i ax months <a. r 
- 1 7 -
defendant had resigned from the Elite Investment Association (R. 
264 at 6-7 and Exhibit 20-S). After becoming concerned because 
they had not received an expected interest payment, the Kendricks 
checked with West Jordan and found that that city had not issued 
any municipal bonds since 1984 (R. 263 at 25). When contacted, 
defendant told them that he had, without informing them, invested 
their money in a Park City bond instead (R. 263 at 25). He then 
sent them a copy of a bond which had been issued in 1986, a year 
before they invested their money (Exhibit 3-S). The issuance 
date of this bond coincides with the evidence from the other 
partners of Elite Investment about Park City bonds which were 
purchased by that association for other investors in 1986 (R. 264 
at 16-17 and Exhibits 21-S, 22-S, and 23-S). Defendant also told 
the Kendricks that he was "in the process" of putting the bonds 
in their names (R. 263 at 26). The copy of the 1986 bond shows 
that it was issued to Elite Investment (Exhibit 3-S). 
The Jensens, Mechams and Neria were told that their 
money was going to be invested in bonds issued by the University 
of Denver (R. 263 at 51-53, 66-67, 84, and 92, and Exhibits 6-S, 
8-S, 11-S, and 13-S). They never received any bonds; defendant 
merely sent them certificates, purportedly from Elite Investment 
(R. 263 at 53-55 and 68-69, and Exhibits 6-S and 8-S). When the 
Jensens gave defendant their money, he told them that he could 
not make out the bond to them without his secretary present and 
she was out (R. 263 at 84). After repeated contacts, defendant 
finally sent the Jensens the certificate purportedly from Elite 
Investment (R. 263 at 84). 
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Defendant, in January 1988, told Mr. Steel that 
defendant had already received $112,000.00 from investors to 
purchase the University of Denver bonds, and that the bond had to 
be purchased within one week (R. 263 at 100). When Mr. Steel did 
not receive an expected interest payment from the bond, he called 
and asked defendant if defendant had purchased the bond. 
Defendant said that he had, and that the bond was sitting in Mr. 
Steel's "records" (R. 263 at 96). By stipulated proffer, the 
State established that no bonds in the name of defendant or of 
Elite Investment Association had been issued by the University of 
Denver in the years 1985 through 1988 (R. 264 at 38-39). 
This admissible evidence establishes that defendant 
took money from five people or couples, promising to purchase 
specific bonds for them. The evidence also establishes that 
defendant did not purchase those bonds even though he told the 
investors that he either had, or would within one week of 
receiving the money. This evidence supports defendant's 
convictions, even without the use of the bank records. 
Theft by deception is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
405 (1990), as: 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains 
or exercises control over property of another 
by deception and with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. 
When defendant obtained the money of the five victims in this 
case he exercised control over their property. The deception and 
purpose elements of theft by deception were proven by defendant's 
actions in telling the victims that he was using their money to 
purchase bonds for them. The bonds were never purchased. That, 
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by itself may not have supported defendant's convictions; 
however, defendant also told some of the victims that he already 
had the bonds and that the bonds were contained in the victim's 
file. Another victim received a copy of a bond which had been 
purchased two years earlier by investors in Elite Investment 
Association. Defendant also held himself out to be a trustee of 
Elite Investment, several months after he had resigned from that 
organization. These acts of deception support the jury's 
determination that defendant deceived the victims in this case, 
and that his purpose was to permanently deprive the victims of 
the money which they had given him. 
Securities fraud is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 
(1989), as: 
It is unlawful for any person, in 
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, 
not misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person. 
When defendant offered to purchase securities for the victims, 
making the untrue statements which are enumerated above, he 
committed the crimes of securities fraud. A review of the 
practice which defendant used to bring the victims to him, to 
offer to buy the bonds, then to attempt to lull the victims with 
certificates from an organization of which defendant was no 
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longer part, supports the jury's determination that defendant 
employed a scheme to defraud, or engaged in a practice or course 
of business which operated as a fraud on the victims. 
POINT III 
BECAUSE THE STATE CONCEDES THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
ENTITLED TO NOTICE UNDER S 78-27-46, THE 
ARGUMENT THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO NOTICE UNDER 
OTHER THEORIES NEED NOT BE ADDRESSED. 
Defendant next argues that he was entitled to notice 
that his financial records were going to be accessed under other 
theories even if the exemption of § 78-27-50 applied to this 
case. Because the State concedes that the exemption of that 
section, as it read at the time defendant's records were 
accessed, is not applicable to this case, this argument need not 
be addressed. 
POINT IV 
THE ISSUE OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE 
SUMMARIES OF THE FINANCIAL RECORDS PREPARED 
FOR TRIAL ALSO NEED NOT BE ADDRESSED. 
Defendant's next contention is that the summaries of 
the account records prepared by the investigator should not have 
been admitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
While the summaries would normally have been admissible under 
3 
rule 1006, Utah Rules of Evidence, the fact that the underlying 
This rule reads: 
The contents of voluminous writings, 
recordings, or photographs which cannot 
conveniently be examined in court may be 
presented in the form of a chart, summary, or 
calculation. The originals, or duplicates, 
shall be made available for examination or 
copying, or both, by other parties at a 
reasonable time and place. The court may 
order that they be produced in court. 
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account records were not admissible makes it unnecessary to 
address defendant's claim. If the account records were not 
admissible, summaries of those records also were not admissible. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY SENTENCED FOR BOTH 
THEFT BY DECEPTION AND FOR SECURITIES FRAUD; 
HOWEVER, THE SENTENCE IMPOSED FOR SECURITIES 
FRAUD WAS INCORRECT. 
Defendant argues that the securities fraud counts are 
lesser included offenses of the theft by deception counts, and 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) and (3) (1990) prohibit conviction 
and punishment for both crimes. Although defendant mentions both 
of these subsections, they are not interchangeable, and his legal 
analysis mainly addresses the lesser included offense language of 
subsection (3). 
Section 76-1-402(1) and (3) read: 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a 
single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode; however, when the same act of a 
defendant under a single criminal episode 
shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different 
provisions of this code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision[.] 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An offense 
is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts required 
to establish the commission of the offense 
charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, 
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged 
or an offense otherwise included therein; 
or 
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(c) It is specifically designated by a 
statute as a lesser included offense. 
Subsection (1) addresses cases in which a defendant is 
charged with separate crimes arising out of a single criminal 
episode. The crimes are not necessarily charged as lesser 
included offenses; in fact, the charges may be separate counts of 
the same crime. For example, in State v. Suarez, 736 P.2d 1040 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), Suarez was convicted of three counts of 
forcible sexual abuse. Suarez challenged his conviction, 
maintaining that two of the counts were the same offense. This 
Court affirmed the convictions, holding that, although both 
counts charged forcible sexual abuse, they were separate offenses 
because they were based on separate acts of the defendant. In 
Suarez, the defendant had 
first placed his mouth on the victim's 
breasts, the taking of indecent liberties, 
and then placed his hand on her vagina. 
These are separate acts requiring proof of 
different elements and constitute separate 
offenses. . . . No violation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-1-402(1) (1978) appears. 
736 P.2d at 1042 (citation omitted). See also State v. Porter, 
705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) (defendant's convictions of 
aggravated burglary of an apartment, burglary of a laundry room 
in the same apartment complex, and theft were affirmed as 
separate acts); State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1986) 
(defendants' convictions of aggravated burglary, aggravated 
kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft of firearms were 
affirmed); State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1239 (Utah 1989) 
(defendant's conviction of aggravated kidnapping, kidnapping, two 
counts of aggravated sexual assault, and one count of aggravated 
robbery affirmed). In O'Brien, the Utah Supreme Court said: 
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The intent of [Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
402(1)] is clear. A defendant may not be 
punished twice for a single act. Although 
defendants' [sic] crimes were committed 
during a single criminal episode, the crimes 
were a result of separate and distinct acts 
that resulted in separate and distinct 
crimes. 
721 P.2d at 900 (footnote omitted). While subsection (1) does 
overlap with subsection (3), i.e., a defendant may not be 
punished twice for a single act, subsection (1) is not limited to 
crimes which are lesser included offenses. 
Although admittedly a close question, defendant's 
convictions do not violate subsection (l)'s "same act" provision. 
To analyze the acts which make these separate crimes, it is 
necessary to examine the elements of the crimes charged. Theft 
by deception is defined by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 
(1990) reads: 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains 
or exercises control over property of another 
by deception and with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, 
however, when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance, or 
puffing by statements unlikely to deceive 
ordinary persons in the group addressed. 
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation 
of wares or worth in communications addressed 
to the public or to a class or group. 
Deception is defined as follows: 
"Deception" occurs when a person 
intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or 
conduct an impression of law or fact that 
is false and that the actor does not 
believe to be true and that is likley 
[sic] to affect the judgment of another in 
the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression 
of law or fact that the actor previously 
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created or confirmed by words or conduct 
that is likely to affect the judgment of 
another and that the actor does not now 
believe to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring 
information likely to affect his judgment 
in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or 
encumbers property without disclosing a 
lien, security interest, adverse claim, or 
other legal impediment to the enjoyment of 
the property, whether the lien, security 
interest, claim, or impediment is or is 
not valid or is or is not a matter of 
official record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely 
to affect the judgment of another in the 
transaction, which performance the actor 
does not intend to perform or knows will 
not be performed; provided, however, that 
failure to perform the promise in issue 
without other evidence of intent or 
knowledge is not sufficient proof that the 
actor did not intend to perform or knew 
the promise would not be performed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5) (1990). 
Securities fraud is criminalized in the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989) provides: 
It is unlawful for any person, in 
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, 
not misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person. 
The evidence presented at trial was that defendant 
offered and sold securities to the victims in a fraudulent scheme 
or practice. The actual sales of the securities were the acts 
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for which defendant was convicted of theft by deception. If 
those were the acts for which defendant was convicted of 
securities fraud, the securities fraud convictions could not 
stand. Convictions for both theft by deception and securities 
fraud based on the same acts of selling securities to the victims 
would violate section 76-1-402(1). If, on the other hand, the 
securities fraud convictions were based on the offers to sell 
securities to the victims, the convictions can coexist. The acts 
of offering to sell the securities were distinct from the acts of 
selling the securities. 
The record is not totally clear as to whether the 
securities fraud counts were based on the offer or the sale of 
the securities. The jury instructions do not differentiate 
between the two different acts. Instruction No. 12 recites Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-1, including "in connection with the offer, 
sale, or purchase of any security" (R. at 171). Instruction No. 
13 separately defines "security," "sale" or "sell," and "offer" 
or "offer to sell" (R. at 172-73). Instruction No. 14 defines 
the phrase "in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any 
security" (R. at 174). Instructions No. 18 through 22 give the 
elements of each of the counts of securities fraud; each recites 
the language of section 61-1-1. The first element of each 
instruction is: "That between October 24, 1987 through August 3, 
1988, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Dennis 
Waite, a party to the offense, did offer, sell or purchase a 
security" (R. at 178-82). In that regard, the jury instructions 
did not draw attention to the difference between the act of 
offering and the act of selling a security. 
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Neither is the trial record completely clear as to 
whether the State's theory of the case was that the securities 
fraud was based on the offer of the securities. In his initial 
closing argument, the prosecutor did not focus on which acts, 
other than the deception, specifically supported the securities 
fraud counts (T. 264 at 56-67). The defense attorney did focus 
on the offer element when he said, "Mr. Waite did not offer to 
sell [the victims] a security" (R. 254 at 70). In final closing, 
the prosecutor did concentrate the jury's attention on the act of 
offering to sell a security: 
The defense seems to think we are piling 
it on, I guess, by charging him with both 
theft by deception and securities fraud. 
What I tried to suggest to you is that the 
reason he is charged with the securities 
fraud is because he offered to sell a 
security, a bond. If he had been offering 
something totally unrelated, then he never 
would have been charged with that. But in 
addition to the securities fraud, he violates 
the theft statute by simply taking the money 
and not delivering anything. Whether it is 
stocks, bonds, whatever. It is the fact he 
took the money, he deceived these people, and 
that makes it a violation of both of these 
statutes. We see that from time to time 
where criminal conduct violates more than one 
statute that has been passed by the 
legislature. So, it is not a situation where 
we just decided to charge him with as many 
counts as we could. It is the situation 
where the facts seem to apply to both of 
these different statutes. 
(R. 264 at 80). If this may be called the prosecution's theory 
of the case, it supports defendant's convictions on all ten 
counts. If the jury was focused on the offers as the acts for 
which they convicted defendant of securities fraud, those acts 
were separate from the acts which supported the theft by 
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deception, and no violation of section 76-1-402(1)'s "same act" 
provision occurs. However, if the jury was not properly focused 
on the offers, but convicted defendant of securities fraud for 
the sales of the securities, those acts were the same acts that 
constituted the theft by deception, and the securities fraud 
convictions cannot stand. 
Defendant's legal analysis of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 
concentrates on subsection (3), which deals with lesser included 
offenses. An offense is included when "[i]t is established by 
proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged." Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-1-402(3)(a). In State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), the 
Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he greater-lesser relationship must be 
determined by comparing the statutory 
elements of the two crimes as a theoretical 
matter and, where necessary, by reference to 
the facts proved at trial. 
674 P.2d at 97. The elements of the crimes of theft by deception 
and securities fraud are set out above. A theoretical comparison 
of the elements demonstrates that securities fraud is not a 
lesser included offense of theft by deception. In State v. 
Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27 (1962), the Utah Supreme 
Court established the rule as to when one offense is included in 
another. The Court said: 
[T]he greater offense includes a lesser one 
when establishment of the greater would 
necessarily include proof of all of the 
elements necessary to prove the lesser. 
Conversely, it is only when the proof of the 
lesser offense requires some element not 
involved in the greater offense that the 
lesser would not be an included offense. 
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371 P.2d at 29 (emphasis added). See also State v, Williams, 636 
P.2d 1092, 1096 (Utah 1981) (quoting the above citations from 
Brennan); State v. Gandee, 587 P.2d 1064, 1066 (1978) ("when the 
proof of what is claimed to be a lesser offense requires some 
element not necessarily involved in the greater offense, then the 
claimed lesser offense would not necessarily be an offense 
included in the greater one"). 
While there is overlap between the fraud element of the 
two statutes, there is a distinction which makes securities fraud 
a separate offense, not a lesser included offense. Theft by 
deception occurs when a person "obtains or exercises control over 
property of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405. Securities fraud 
occurs when "any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or 
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly . . . (1) 
employ[s] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; (2) make[s] 
any untrue statement of a material fact or . . . omit[s] to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading; or (3) engage[s] in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1. Theft by deception 
involves the elements of obtaining or exercising control over the 
property of another with the intent to deprive him thereof; these 
elements are not required to prove securities fraud. The only 
overlapping element of the two crimes is the deception or fraud 
element. 
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The element required for securities fraud which is not 
required for theft by deception is that the fraud must be "in 
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security." 
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-1. This element must be proven in order to 
establish the crime of securities fraud but is not involved in 
proving the crime of theft by deception. Consequently, under 
Brennan, Williams, and Gandee, securities fraud is not a lesser 
included offense of theft by deception. The trial court 
correctly imposed sentences on defendant for all ten crimes of 
which he was convicted. 
The inquiry does not end with a theoretical comparison 
of the elements. State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1240 (Utah 
1989). Quoting Hill, the Court said: 
The secondary test is required by the 
circumstance that some crimes have multiple 
variations, so that a greater-lesser 
relationship exists between some variations 
of these crimes, but not between others. . . 
A theoretical comparison of the statutory 
elements of two crimes having multiple 
variations will be insufficient. In order to 
determine whether a defendant can be 
convicted and punished for two different 
crimes committed in connection with a single 
criminal episode, the court must consider the 
evidence to determine whether the greater-
lesser relationship exists between the 
specific variations of the crimes actually 
proved at trial. 
780 P.2d at 1240 (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Hill, 674 
P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983)). Even under this secondary test, 
defendant was properly convicted of both securities fraud and 
theft by deception. The State proved the theft by deception 
charges when it proved that defendant obtained money from five 
different victims; that he obtained the money by means of 
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deception; and that he demonstrated a purpose to deprive the 
victims of the money. Securities fraud was proven when the State 
presented evidence that defendant used a fraudulent scheme in 
connection with the offer of a securities. The deception or 
fraud, manifested by the same acts of defendant, overlapped 
between the two crimes. However, the State was required to prove 
that defendant obtained the property of the victims with the 
purpose to deprive them thereof in order to establish theft by 
deception. It was then required to prove the additional fact 
that the fraudulent scheme was in connection with the offer of 
securities in order to prove the securities fraud charges. 
Subsection (3)(a) is written in terms of "facts 
required to establish the commission" of the offenses (emphasis 
added). The facts which establish the elements of theft by 
deception and of securities fraud may have some overlap; however, 
either theoretically or under the specific variations of the 
crimes, different facts are required to be proven to establish 
the different crimes. Consequently, securities fraud is not a 
lesser included offense of theft by deception. 
Defendant's final contention is that the trial court 
erred in sentencing defendant to a term of one to fifteen years 
in the Utah State Prison for each of the five counts of 
securities fraud. While defendant failed to object to the 
4 
imposition of this sentence, the sentence is incorrect under the 
4 
The only exchange concerning the prison term for securities 
fraud occurred between the court and the prosecution at the 
sentencing hearing on September 11, 1989. At that time, the 
following transpired: 
MR. JONES [the prosecutor]: . . . But as 
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statute. Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-21 (1989) (amended 1990). In 
State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court 
said: 
This Court does not disturb a sentence unless 
it exceeds that prescribed by law or unless 
the trial court has abused its discretion. 
State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978). 
728 P.2d at 988. Since the law at the time that defendant was 
sentenced prescribed that the prison term for securities fraud 
was zero to three years, the sentence of one to fifteen years for 
each count was erroneous. This matter should be remanded to the 
trial court to correct the sentences for the five securities 
fraud counts. 
4 
Cont. to each of the Securities Counts by 
themselves, I would ask the Court to run 
those consecutive. I think they carry a zero 
to three years in prison. 
THE COURT: The securities carries a zero 
to three. 
MR. JONES: I think it is a zero to three. 
THE COURT: They are second degree 
felonies. 
MR. JONES: Oh, are they? I could be 
mistaken. For some reason I thought they 
were zero to three. 
(R. 265 at 54). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's convictions and remand for 
correction of sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this r2g£ day of August, 1990. 
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